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Democracy as a Goal of 
Union Organization: 
An Interprétation of the 
United States Expérience 
S. Muthuchidambaram 
This paper présents a overall review and an interprétation 
of the vast existing literature on union democracy in the 
United States. 
Introduction 
Since 1940's when the issue of democracy versus bureaucracy in labor 
unions has moved into the foreground of attention, articles and books 
written on this problem hâve been so numerous as to create a feeling of 
frustration and hopelessness in reviewing the literature. One « Biblio-
graphical Review » covering 1945-55 contains 429 items dealing directly 
or indirectly on « Trade Union Government, Its Nature and Its Pro-
blems » (1). This « Review » excludes articles in Government Publications, 
semi-professional journals and union publications. 
When Industrial Relations Research Association Index and Cornell 
Industrial & Labor Relations Review Index is added to the above « Re-
view », the total number of publications on the subject, up to 1965, exceeds 
1000. It is fair to say that anybody writing on « Union Democracy », may 
hâve almost nothing « original » to contribute. The following review of 
literature is to indicate the trend of 
thought, not exhaustive but sélective 
in scope. 
(') Daisy L. Tagliacozzo — « Trade Union Government : A Bibliographical Review: 
1945-55 » — American Journal of Sociology, May 1956, Vol. LXI, No. 6 P. 554-
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Review of Literature on Union Democracy 
LlTERATURE ON TRADE UNION THEORIES : 
The primary literature in this field cornes from trade union theorists, 
the Marxists and non-Marxists. With Perlman, theorizing on unionism has 
virtually corne to and end. What followed is a variety of « conceptual frame 
works » on unions developed by Taft, Tannenbaum, Dunlop, Whyte, Har-
binson, Dubin, Kerr, Siegel, Shister, Lipset, Lindblom, Lester, Rees, etc. In 
terms of method of study, the earliest préoccupation was with union cons-
titutions, publications, etc., followed by questionnaires, interview guides 
and participant observation techniques. Some studies of union democracy 
were based on even projective techniques and attitudinal studies., In the 
récent past, interdisciplinary approach has become popular in theorizing on 
unions. 
STUDIES ON TRADE UNION GOVERNMENT 
Trade Union « government » has been analyzed in the literature in 
term of democracy versus centralization and union governments hâve been 
classified by structure and function. The degree of union democracy has 
been described in terms of the ideological characteristics of the leaders. 
Factionalism seems to be another tool measuring union democracy. Other 
major factors considered in studies of this type are union rules and régul-
ations, such as union security and right to work, disciplinary powers and 
appeals, administrative policies and discriminations, financial reports and 
élections. Concepts of « government », « compulsory citizenship », 
« treason » (i.e. unbecoming activity of a union member), « sovereignty » 
are used as analogy in explaining the control structure within unions. In 
fact, Albert Rees extends Stalin's concept of « capitalistic encirclement » 
as explanatory variable to justify rigid internai disciplines of the U.S. 
unions. <2) 
THE RANK AND FILE STUDIES 
The récent studies of the attitudes of union members are in part a 
reaction to the earlier concentration on union régulations and in part a 
reflection of the concern with membership participation in unions, they 
were also stimulated to some extent by Perlman's concept of job-conscious-
ness. The apathy of union members has been among the most widely dis-
cussed problems in the study of union democracy. The members of unions 
are found to be exercising « their inaliénable right to be indiffèrent ». 
(2) Albert Rees, The Economies of Trade Unions, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1962, Chapter X. 
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Studies of local unions analyze the unique factors which may in each case 
stimulate or discourage participation by the rank and file. How changes 
in the composition and attitudes of members can alter patterns of particip-
ation and threaten control is illustrated by some studies. 
UNION LEADERSHIP STUDIES 
This group of studies deals with the conflicting pressures on labor 
leaders; their values and attitudes toward their rôle; obstacles to their 
recruitment; patterns of their ascent; their attitudes toward the présent 
économie and social system; and case studies of their careers. « Adminis-
trators », « social leader », « progressive », « mature » etc., are the des-
criptive terms used and degree of union democracy is explained in thèse 
terms. 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING STUDIES 
The literature on collective bargaining is the most voluminous throwing 
light on union democracy, in terms of (a) changing trends in bargaining, 
(b) complexity of the bargaining and conséquent need for specialization 
and expertise, (c) types and development of union-management relation-
ships, (d) décision making process in bargaining, (e) needed degree of 
conflict to perform this function, (f ) rôle of game theory and play acting, 
etc. In this area of studies environmental factors hâve been given due 
considération in explaining the nature of union democracy. 
Scope of This Paper 
It is physically impossible to review literatures by authors with neces-
sary footnotes in this paper of limited scope. And in fact, studies on union 
democracy évade categorization whatever might be the criteria of classi-
fication. There are too many « facts » and conflicting finding but there 
appears to be little reflection on thèse accumulated studies. It is not merely 
the lack of reflection and synthesis which is a major gap but the normative 
orientation involved in the subject and the faithful acceptance of the major 
assumptions on this problem. 
Hence the thème of this paper is to re-examine the concept of « iron 
law of oligarchy » and reinterpret the same in terms of « growth and 
environmental » factors of union. 
The Iron Law of Oligarchy 
This thème was developed by Robert Michels in his Political Parties, 
which appeared in 1915 (3>. While his prime concern was with the political 
(3) Robert Michels, Political Parties, Glencoe-Free Press, 1958. 
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arm of labor, the socialist parties, his conclusions hâve been grouped for 
ail of labor organizations under « iron law of oligarchy ». The sub-title of 
his work is « A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Mo-
dem Democracy ». 
Michels traces the development of démocratie organizations and their 
metarmorphosis into oligarchies. The Michelian schéma unfolds in a séries 
of steps. At first there is control by the masses but physical limitations 
of time, space and even physiology soon produce a system based on délé-
gation. Officiais at first are closely tied to the will of the majority and can 
easily be removed from office. As the organization continues an élite 
develops, composed of its leaders. Technical specialization is called for and 
créâtes expert leadership. The leaders, who possess this expertise 
emancipate themselves from the mass and become independent of its 
control. Thus the oligarchical tendency manifests itself. « As a resuit of 
organization, every party or professional union becomes divided into a 
minority of directors and a majority of directed. »(4) The membership must 
give up the idea of supervising the administration and the leader conducts 
an increasing amount of organization business. « Though it grumbles 
occasionally, the majority is really delighted to find persons who will take 
the trouble to look after its affairs. » (5) Michels feels that a création of a 
bureaucracy is indispensable to the conduct of the organization's business. 
In the Michelian system however, centralization is not the only 
movement which is observable. Concurrently with the centralizing process 
is a move towards decentralization. « The idea of decentralization makes 
continuous progress, together with a revolt against the suprême authority 
of the central executive. » <°) The tendencies towards decentralization are 
not démocratie however. They are the work of a small group of leaders who 
rather than submit to the central executive withdraw to their own sphères 
of power. Such men would rather be big fish in a small pond then relinquish 
control. Their programs stress « autonomy ». 
The movement towards decentralization does not conflict with the 
gênerai model of oligarchy. Thèse minority movements merely represent 
an effort to partition authority, « to split up the great oligarchies into a 
number of smaller oligarchies. » (7) The dominance of oligarchy remains 
unchallenged. 
(4) Ibid., p. 37 
(5) Ibid., p. 58 
(6) Ibid., p. 208. 
(7) Ibid., p. 210. 
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Michels feels strongly that democracy has an inhérent bias towards 
solving important matters in an authoritarian fashion. In fact, he equates 
the oligarchy which stems from democracy with a dictatorship and notes, 
« there is little différence between individual dictatorship and the dicta-
torship of a group of oligarchies. »•<*> 
From this analysis he has produced the famous and catch-ail « iron 
law of oligarchy » which perhaps is neither iron nor law but a statement 
of central tendency. 
Almost thirty years later, during the second World War, another 
observer examined the problems of democracy and bureaucracy in unions 
and reached similar conclusions. (9> Herberg felt that while the union was 
created to protect the member from his boss, a need had developed to 
protect the member from the union. The union takes on a dual character. 
On one hand, it is a business-like service organization; on the other it 
represents the expression and vehicle of the laboring masses for « social 
récognition and démocratie self-determination. » <10> The great conflict 
develops between thèse two drives. As a business, dealing with business 
and administering its affair the union requires efficient bureaucratie ad-
ministration. As a movement for social justice, the union requires démo-
cratie self-expression. Michels would argue that thèse two characteristics 
are irreconciable. Herberg sidesteps the question somewhat. Though 
Herberg touches on « growth » problem, he has not explored it in détail. 
Thus in his analysis of the development of a union hierarchy, Herberg is 
quite close to Michels. 
The British scholar V. L. Allen has dealt with the problem of trade 
union democracy in his book Power in Trade Unions. (11> Allen argues that 
unionism has the effect of extending democracy to industrial society but 
that unions themselves are not démocratie. This is due to the fact that, 
« the end of trade union activity is to protect and improve the gênerai 
living standards of its members and not to provide workers with an 
exercise in self-government. » (12) To achieve the desired ends a monolithic 
bureaucratie type of organization is developed. Allen seems to agrée that 
the primary goal of union organization precludes internai democracy. 
Inevitably the control of large organizations rests in the hands of a minor-
(8) Ibid., p . 401. 
(9) Will Herberg, « Bureaucracy and Democracy in Labor Unions », Article Review, 
September, 1943. 
(10) Ibid., p . 407. 
(") V. L. Allen, Power in Trade Unions, London, 1958. 
(12) V. L. Allen, p. 15. 
584 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 24, NO 3 
ity, even where the structure of the organization is desired to avoid this. 
Allen would rely on the size of the membership to keep the leadership 
in Une. « A trade union leader who is in continuai fear of losing his mem-
bers will inevitably take steps to satisfy their wants. » (18> In Allen's 
schéma self-government becomes a means towards an end and not an end 
in itself. 
A work which is often thought of as favorable to the prospects for 
internai democracy is Union Democracy by Lipset, Trow and Coleman. <14> 
However, careful reading indicates that, in fact, a quite discouraging 
outlook for democracy is found. The development of démocratie practices 
in the International Typographical Union was found to be largely acci-
dentai. « If some event in the early history had turned the other way, then 
present-day democracy in the union would hâve been less likely. The 
existence of democracy at présent may be likened to a séries of successive 
outeomes of casting dice, dice which are with each favorable throw more 
heavily loaded toward a favorable outeome in the next throw. » <1S) When 
the ITU Study is generalized a pessimistic conclusion is reached. Il: is sug-
gested that the functional requirements for democracy cannot be met most 
of the time in most unions or other voluntary groups. The authors conclude, 
« The implication of our analysis for démocratie organizational politics 
are almost as pessimistic as those postulated by Robert Michels. » (16) 
Hence, Peter Magrath has argued that « in a very real sensé the study of 
union government has not progressed much beyond Michels' analysis. > (17> 
The Iron Law of Democracy and Other Interprétations 
Four years before Peter Magrath's article appeared, Gouldner has 
suggested that théories tend to hâve a « metaphysical pathos » or a set of 
sentiments which limit our observations and formulation. (18> We are so 
accustomed to certain ways of thinking that it becomes hard for us to 
conceive of alternative explanations. Gouldner argues that there might 
be an « Iron Law of Democracy » as well as « Iron Law of Oligarchy. » 
This dialectical model recognizes the coexistence of both tendencies in an 
organization. And in fact Lester's « As Union Mature » does not deny this 
(1S) lbid., p. 63. 
(14) S. M. Lipset, et al, Union Democracy, Glencoe, 1957. 
(15) Lipset, et al, p. 394. 
<16) lbid., p. 403-404. 
(17) Peter Magrath, « Democracy in Overalls 2> — / & LRR, July 1959, p. 521. 
(18) Gouldner. « Metaphysical Pathos and the Theory of Bureaucracy » Am. Pol. So. 
Review, Vol. 49. 1955. p. 496-507. 
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possibility, similar évolution in other organizations has been suggested 
by Weber, Hoffer, Riesman, Rostow and others. Thèse interprétations 
appear to be more dynamic and flexible. 
Studies in social change not only confirms this relation between 
growth and démocratie process but gives better explanation of « why » 
such démocratie process is inévitable to create an organization. « At a 
time people are in the process of creating a new organization, they are 
forced to solve problems which are quite new. Since there are no esta-
blished patterns to go by, individuals must be free to create new ones — 
a true démocratie process in terms of accepting créative ideas. » <19) 
The studies evaluated up to this point indicated the gênerai tendencies 
in organizational growth. But what has not ben explained is the peculiarities 
of the U.S. trade unions. The following section deals with this problem. 
Cross-Cultural and Environmental Explanations 
Cross-cultural studies of union democracy, by and large, confirms 
the notion that the U.S. trade unions are comparatively less démocratie, 
less means oriented, more end oriented and more modelled after the U.S. 
business corporations.(20) As Galenson makes it clear, the structure of 
union grows out of economy, the social and political history of a nation. 
In the U.S., the Wagner Act made a momentous option for the concept of 
exclusive jurisdiction. This décision has become a historical necessity, 
and an ideological alternative {to eliminate radicalism) to « un-Amer-
icanism ». This décision, along with a range of économie, historié and 
social factors, hâve given real power to the traditional American rejection 
of dual unionism. Union has been accepted as a necessary evil, obviously 
a lesser evil thon radicalism. 
(19) Zollaschan and Hirsch, Explorations in Social Change, Houghton Mifflin Co., 
Boston, 1964, p. 462. 
C20) (a) Lipset. The Law and Trade Union Democracy, Reprint No. 186 — Institute 
of I.R., University of California, 1962. 
(b) Galenson. Trade Union Democracy in Western Europe, University of Cali-
fornia, 1962. 
(c) Lipset. Value Patterns of Democracy — Comparative Analysis, Reprint 
207, University of California, 1963. 
(d) Seidman. Democracy in Labor Movement, Bulletin 39, Cornell University, 
1958. 
(e) Kasselow. Development of Western Labor Movement — Some Comparative 
Considérations, Reprint 62, I.R.R.I., Wisconsin. 
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Thus, even the more dynamic growth interprétation becomes 
inadéquate and this must be supplemented by environmental and cultural 
interprétation. The most significant factor in explaining the déviant nature 
(a déviation in degree if not in kind) of the U.S. unions, appears to be 
that of the U.S. pluralism based on pressure group phylosophy. 
If partially accepted institutions, (a necessary evil according to 
Galenson), like U.S. trade unions, are to survive among the other power-
ful, ideologically accepted, socialy integrated pressure groups, power 
accumulation should become an end in itself; the pressure groups by 
définition are forced to sacrifice means for the sake of ends. This type of 
interprétation has been applied to the U.S. System as a whole, somietimes 
in qualified and sometimes in categorical terms, by an impressive number 
of journalists, academicians and political scientists.(21) Some of them assert 
that pressure-group and internal-democracy within the group is a contra-
diction of terms. Even though one may not fully agrée with this thème, 
it has some relevance in interpreting the internai democracy of the U.S. 
trade unions. 
Democracy - Pluralism — Bureaucracy 
Truman's « Governmental Process », Kornhauser's « Politics of Mass 
Society » and Maclver's « Web of Government », hâve given due considér-
ation to this fundamental question while many others consider internai 
democracy as isolated issue of particular institutions. The above three 
writers agrée that Marx was wrong : it is not the most highly developed 
capitalist Systems which reveal the greatest social unrest, non-democratic 
trends and revolutionary tendencies. Instead, this has been the fate of 
the less developed countries of Europe and more so of Asia and Africa. 
But, if Marx is wrong, will Weber prove to be right ? For Weber, 
bureaucratisation, not class struggle, provides the central dynamic of 
the modem world.(22) It is widely believed that bureaucracy constitutes 
the strongest threat to social pluralism and libéral democracy in the highly 
industrialized countries where the borderline between bureaucracy and 
oligarchy has been narrowing. This view raises important issues about the 
future development of American society — how to temper the power, 
wealth and organizational expertise with justice and idéal ? 
(21) For an excellent treatment of this thème, refer to David Truman's « The Govern-
mental Process », particularly the concluding chapter of this book. New York, Knopf, 
1951. 
(22) Weber. Essays in Sociology, New York, Oxford University Press, 1946, p. 49. 
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Conclusion 
Professor Laski sums up the basic issue of our problem in thèse 
words : 
We built a povverful society without adéquate thought for the 
purposes to which its power was to be devoted. We built a wealthy 
society without adéquate conçern about the objects upon which its 
wealth should be expended. We thought that justice would be the 
inhérent conséquence of our acquisition of power and wealth. What 
we forget is that societies are not bound together by material con-
quests, their unity is found in equal dévotion to a common idéal. (2S) 
This writer is in gênerai agreement with Laski's thesis. The major 
pressure groups in the U.S. seem to hâve extraordinary power, enough 
wealth, but inadéquate common ideals and hence they are more end-
oriented at the cost of means, in popular parlance the « American prag-
matism ». After ail, the trade union is just one among them. Questioning 
the fundamentals of the U.S. society may appear to be odious to many 
American intellectuals, but to a foreigner this line of reasoning appears 
to be more realistic, particularly in finding an explanation for the existing 
différence between the U.S. trade unions and the European ones, though 
the différence may be in degree. P*> 
LA DÉMOCRATIE SYNDICALE : UNE INTERPRÉTATION 
DE L'EXPÉRIENCE AMÉRICAINE 
INTRODUCTION 
Depuis les années '40, la démocratie syndicale a fait l'objet de nombreuses études 
et donné lieu à une vaste littérature. On va tenter ici d'identifier les grandes tendances 
dans les lignes de pensée à ce sujet. 
BRÈVE REVUE DE LA LITTÉRATURE SUR LA DÉMOCRATIE SYNDICALE 
Littérature sur les théories du syndicalisme 
En termes de méthodologie utilisée, les premiers théoriciens étaient surtout 
préoccupés par la revue des constitutions et publications syndicales alors que leurs 
successeurs utilisaient les questionnaires, les interviews et les techniques d'observation 
participante. Certains employèrent même des techniques projectives et des enquêtes 
d'attitudes. Plus récemment, l'approche interdisciplinaire est devenue la nouvelle 
mode en théorie syndicale. 
t.23) Laski. Democracy in ^Crisis — University of North Carolina Press, 1933, p. 264. 
(24) For a clear exposition of the crisis in the value system and goals in the U.S., see 
J. K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1967; 
pp. 171-78; 386-87; 398-99; 346-53 and 407-9. 
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Les études portant sur le gouvernement des syndicats 
Le gouvernement des syndicats a été analysé en termes de démocratie versus 
centralisation et ce au moyen des outils suivants : les caractéristiques idéologiques 
des leaders, le factionalisme et les sortes de règles syndicales. 
Les études sur le membership 
Moussées par l'intérêt sur les règles syndicales, ces études reflètent la préoccupa-
tion de la participation des membres à la vie du syndicat. 
Les leaders syndicaux 
Ces études portent surtout sur la personnalité, compétence et ascendance des 
chefs syndicaux. 
Les travaux sur la négociation collective 
La littérature sur la négociation collective est la plus volumineuse portant sur la 
démocratie syndicale. 
LE CONCEPT DE « IRON LAW OF OLIGARCHY » 
Ce thème a été développé par Michels dans son Political Parties de 1915 où il y 
retrace le développement des organisations démocratiques et leur métamorphose en 
oligarchies en ce sens que les leaders-experts s'émancipent de la masse et deviennent 
indépendants de son contrôle. Michels croit que la création d'une bureaucratie est 
indispensable à la conduite d'une organisation. En plus, l'auteur ajoute que la décen-
tralisation inévitable représente une tendance qui est loin d'être démocratique parce 
qu'elle est le fait de sous-groupes de leaders qui se donnent des sphères de contrôle. 
C'est la dominance de l'oligarchie. Will Herberg présenta des conclusions à peu près 
similaires dans les années '30. Allen toucha un peu à cet aspect anti-démocratique des 
syndicats en avançant que les unions ont comme effet d'accroître la démocratie dans 
la société industrielle, mais qu'en soi elles ne sont pas démocratiques. 
L'étude du syndicat international des typographes faite par Lipset, Trow et 
Coleman suggère que les exigences fonctionnelles de la démocratie ne peuvent pas 
être rencontrées la plupart du temps dans la plupart des syndicats ou autres asso-
ciations volontaires. 
Alors y a-t-il eu progrès depuis l'étude de Michels ? 
L'ENVIRONNEMENT ET LA CULTURE COMME FACTEUR D'EXPLICATION 
Des études comparatives démontrent que les syndicats américains sont moins 
démocratiques, moins orientés vers les moyens à utiliser, plus pragmatiques et plus 
modelés sur les entreprises américaines. 
CONCLUSION 
Les groupes de pression aux États-Unis ont un pouvoir extraordinaire, une 
richesse suffisante, mais ils sont caractérisés par un manque d'idéaux communs et 
sont ainsi plus orientés vers le coût des moyens à utiliser. En un mot, c'est le prag-
matisme américain. 
